When Courts Rule but Sanctions Stay: Europe’s Sanctions Enforcement Issues
A landmark judgement in the Maya Tokareva case reflects a deepening rift in the EU’s sanctions regime – both between the EU’s judicial and executive powers and between central and national governments.
On February 11, the EU General Court delivered an unprecedented judgment in the case of Maya Tokareva, daughter of Russia’s Transneft president Nikolai Tokarev. For the first time, the court explicitly called out the EU Council for flouting its own judicial decisions. A rare institutional rebuke that raises uncomfortable questions about whether Europe’s sanctions system still functions as law, or merely as policy by other means.
Tokareva was added to the EU sanctions list in July 2022 under the bloc’s seventh package targeting individuals linked to Russia’s leadership. The Council’s stated rationale was her father’s alleged role as a financial backer of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine. In September 2022, she challenged the decision. Two years later, the court sided with her, ruling that the Council had failed to demonstrate any connection beyond simple family ties.
The Council later re-listed Tokareva anyway, using the same justification the court had already rejected. In its February judgement, the General Court didn’t mince words: “The Council failed to fulfill its duty… to comply with the delisting decisions… which is capable of undermining the trust that the parties to the proceedings place in compliance with the court rulings.”
When Compliance Becomes Optional
This isn’t just about one individual’s legal battle. It’s a signal that something fundamental has fractured in the relationship between Europe’s executive and judicial branches. When a court begins assessing not merely the adequacy of evidence but the institutional integrity of post-judgment conduct, the calculus changes. What was once framed as a routine “update” to sanctions lists is now judged as deliberate defiance.
However, the problem runs deeper. Even when Brussels does comply — whether voluntarily or under court order — member states have discovered a workaround: national sanctions lists. In March 2025, the EU Council delisted several high-profile individuals, including Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor, an Israeli-domiciled businessman with Russian roots, and Gulbakhor Ismailova, who had been listed in connection with her brother, the billionaire Alisher Usmanov. Within days, Latvia and Estonia reimposed restrictions at the national level, effectively cloning the EU’s sanctions regime in miniature. The result: a decision in Brussels becomes meaningless in Riga or Tallinn. The person is still radioactive to the European financial system. Banks won’t differentiate. Compliance departments won’t take the risk. Reputational exposure doesn’t hinge on jurisdictional niceties.
The Paradox of Harmonization
What makes this dysfunction particularly galling is that Brussels can enforce uniformity when it wants to. In April 2024, the EU adopted a directive mandating that all member states criminalize sanctions evasion by May 2025. The penalties were substantial: up to five years in prison for individuals, fines reaching 5% of global turnover or €40 million for companies. When 18 member states missed the deadline, the European Commission promptly launched infringement proceedings. Enforcement worked. Harmonization happened. Countries fell in line.
Yet when it comes to ensuring member states respect EU court rulings on sanctions, that’s not the case. The Union can dragoon governments into criminalizing circumvention but cannot prevent them from circumventing judicial oversight itself.
A Multi-Tier Ecosystem
The uncomfortable truth for European policymakers is that sanctions have ceased to function as a coherent legal instrument. They’ve evolved into a multi-layered ecosystem where a judicial win at one level can be nullified by administrative fiat at another. And beyond Europe’s borders, external jurisdictions — primarily, the US or UK — act as a shadow enforcement mechanism, shaping European behaviour through dollar clearing systems and risk management protocols.
This is why the Tokareva case matters beyond the immediate litigants. It represents the court’s attempt to inject some legal predictability into a system increasingly governed by contradiction: between Brussels and national capitals, between judicial and executive authority, between European law and transatlantic financial infrastructure.
If the EU genuinely values the credibility of its sanctions regime, it faces a choice. Either tighten enforcement of court rulings and compel member states to respect its own decisions and judicial outcomes. Or acknowledge that sanctions power is devolving to national governments and external allies faster than European integration can keep pace.
For now, the EU seems content to live with the contradiction.
The post When Courts Rule but Sanctions Stay: Europe’s Sanctions Enforcement Issues appeared first on European Business & Finance Magazine.
